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Are Country Reputations for Good and 
Bad Leadership on AIDS Deserved?: 
An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Some countries, like Brazil, have good reputations on AIDS policy, whereas 
others, notably South Africa, have been criticized for inadequate leadership. 
Cross-country regression analysis suggests that most of the ‘poster children’ for 
AIDS leadership have indeed performed better or worse than expected given 
their economic and institutional constraints and the demographic and health 
challenges facing them. Regressions are run on HAART coverage (number on 
highly active antiretroviral therapy as % of total need) and MTCTP coverage 
(pregnant HIV+ women accessing mother-to-child-transmission prevention 
services as % of total need). Brazil, Burkina-Faso, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mali, 
Namibia, Suriname, Thailand, Paraguay, and Uganda performed consistently 
better than expected. South Africa, Uruguay, and Trinidad and Tobago 
performed consistently and significantly worse than expected. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) remains a major challenge 
for global health. Despite an unprecedented mobilization of resources since 
2003 (notably the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and 
the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)), the epidemic 
continues to outstrip attempts to rein it in. In 2007 2.1 million people died of 
AIDS and 2.5 million became infected with the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV), bringing the global total living with HIV to an estimated 33.2 
million.1       
 
Part of the problem is that as foreign assistance flows into AIDS-affected 
countries, inadequacies at the national level have become painfully apparent. 
This, in turn, has placed the spotlight on national government ‘leadership’ on 
AIDS.1-5 Some countries, notably Brazil, Cambodia, Thailand and Mexico have 
established reputations for quick and committed responses to condom promotion 
and the use of antiretrovirals for mother to child transmission prevention 
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(MTCTP) and highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART).8-15 Other countries 
have more contested reputations. For example, Uganda’s President Museveni is 
widely acclaimed for raising awareness about HIV,16-18 but the country’s image 
has been harmed recently by the cancellation of a Global Fund loan and reports 
of inefficiencies and confusion in AIDS prevention and treatment 
interventions.3,5,18,19 Likewise, Botswana is recognized for its rollout of HAART, 
but has more recently been criticized for overly complex protocols.5  Cuba, 
having initially been criticized for confining HIV-positive people to sanitaria,20 
is now seen as a role model for providing HAART21 and MTCTP.22 Countries 
with growing reputations on AIDS leadership include Rwanda, Haiti, Malawi, 
and Namibia.1,5   
 
In short, there exists a group of countries which enjoys reputations as relatively 
good performers on AIDS policy. South Africa, by contrast, is infamous for 
President Mbeki’s support for AIDS denialism and related reluctance to provide 
antiretrovirals for either MTCTP or HAART.23 Russia and Ukraine have 
reputations for stigmatizing injecting drug users, China for human rights abuses, 
and Zambia and Zimbabwe for lack of commitment to HIV prevention and 
treatment.3, 4, 5  
 
But are these reputations for (good or bad) AIDS leadership deserved, or do they 
simply reflect differential capacities and constraints? Consider the case of South 
Africa. In June 2006 a New York Times Op Ed blamed South Africa’s reluctance 
to rollout HAART on President Mbeki’s AIDS denialism.24 The South African 
ambassador responded by arguing that as 134,473 people were receiving 
HAART through the public sector, this accusation was unfair.25 Indeed, given 
that South Africa has the largest HAART program in the world (a point Mbeki 
himself likes to make)26 and faces real economic and institutional constraints,27 
is it really appropriate to argue that South Africa’s leadership has been 
inadequate?   
 
A potentially useful way to approach this is to frame the question of leadership 
explicitly within the context of what was possible and reasonable to expect. This 
paper accordingly uses cross-country regression analysis to explore which 
countries demonstrate relatively good or bad outcomes given the challenges and 
opportunities open to them, and in light of international standards set by 
performance in other countries. The key policy indicator adopted here is 
HAART coverage – i.e. the number of people on HAART expressed as a 
percentage of the total number estimated to need it. MTCTP coverage is also 
explored, but to a more limited extent given that this data is less reliable and is 
available for fewer countries. The analysis was conducted on 82 AIDS-affected 
`countries (defined as countries with an adult HIV prevalence rates of 0.1% or 
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above). These are presented in Figure 1. Data was sourced from UNAIDS, the 
WHO and the World Bank.  
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Figure 1. HAART Coverage and MTCTP Coverage 
 
 
Methods 
 
HAART coverage is a function of objective constraints/opportunities and 
political will on the part of governments to provide HAART to its citizens. 
Ideally, one should be measure political will directly, but attempts to do this 
have proved disappointing and limited in coverage.28,29 Instead, this paper builds 
on previous work using regression analysis to explore the role of political 
will/leadership, indirectly taking into account ‘objective’ 
constraints/opportunities in the regression model, and then using the regression 
residual (the difference between actual and predicted HAART coverage) as an 
indicator of which countries are performing better or worse than expected.29-32   
 
As the residual picks up the influence of all missing variables (i.e. not simply 
unmeasured political will), country performance assessments of this kind should 
be made only on the basis of consistently large residuals. Hence only those 
countries with residuals consistently greater than 15 (i.e. actual HAART 
coverage exceeds predicted coverage by 15 percentage points) are classified as 
performing above expectations. Those with residuals consistently between -15 
and 15 are classified as performing ‘as expected’ and those with residuals below 
-15 are classified as performing ‘below expectations’. Residuals are generated 
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using three different plausible regression specifications. These are presented in 
Table 1 along with residuals for selected countries. Figure 3 displays the results 
for all countries using the main regression model (regression 1) and indicates 
which countries fall into the same classification for all regression specifications.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. HAART Coverage and Per Capita Income 
 
 
The key economic factor constraining governments in their attempt to rollout 
HAART is the amount of resources available. The most important indicator of 
domestic capacity in this regard is per capita income, i.e. the overall level of 
economic development. As can be seen in Figure 2, there is a positive (but 
weak) relationship between per capita income and the level of HAART 
coverage. Countries above the regression line are doing better in terms of 
HAART coverage than would be expected if per capita income was the only 
factor driving HAART coverage (and vice versa for those below the line). The 
recognized poor performers (e.g. Russia, Ukraine and South Africa) fall 
substantially below the line (suggesting that they should have achieved higher 
levels of coverage given their level of development), and the poster children for 
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good performance (Cambodia, Cuba, Brazil, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Thailand, Uganda) fall substantially above it.   
 
Some countries started rolling out HAART almost entirely on the basis of their 
own resources (notably Brazil and Cuba), but most were assisted to do so by 
significant external funding from donors. Although engaging constructively at 
national level with foreign donors is in itself a sign of good leadership (as is 
recognized to be the case in Rwanda), foreign assistance to combat AIDS has 
been channeled through the Global Fund and PEPFAR to a wide variety of 
organizations and NGOs as well as different levels of government, not all of 
which are necessarily in agreement with national policy on AIDS. The impact of 
these additional resources thus needs to be taken into account.  It is done so 
through the inclusion of dummy variables for whether a country is a PEPFAR 
focus country or was a recipient of a (first round) Global Fund grant.  
 
Internal and external resources are crucial determinants of HAART coverage, 
but so too is the scale of the challenge facing governments. For this reason, both 
the (logged) total of HIV positive population and adult HIV prevalence rates are 
included as controls in the model. Similarly, to take into account the fact that it 
is easier to rollout HAART to concentrated urban populations rather than 
scattered, poorly resourced rural populations, we also include the percentage of 
HIV positive people living in urban areas as an explanatory variable. We also 
include the percentage of births in the presence of skilled health professionals 
(as an indicator variable of the capacity and reach of the health sector), and two 
political/institutional variables: political stability in 2005 and a dummy variable 
for whether a country is an established democracy or not. The reasoning here 
was that established democracies are likely to have better functioning 
administrations than new democracies and that political stability is more 
conducive to good administration and the prioritization of health than situations 
characterized by political instability.   
 
HIV is, of course, not the only health challenge facing developing countries and 
it would be unreasonable to expect all national leaders to prioritize HIV to the 
same extent. Countries with a heavy burden of other diseases should not be 
expected to have as great a HAART rollout as countries with fewer competing 
health challenges. In order to account for this, we use the (log of) the number of 
disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost due to non-AIDS related reasons as a 
proxy for non-AIDS related demands on the health budget.  
 
Another challenge which we may consider accounting for explicitly has to do 
with the degree of language diversity within a country. Language diversity may 
well constrain a HAART rollout as it raises the costs and the difficulty of 
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providing the necessary information and services to all language groups. 
However, one of the problems with including such a variable is that it may also 
be accounting in part for an explicit policy choice.  For example, if the 
government draws support disproportionately from one or a few language 
groups, then it may choose not to prioritize the needs of people from other 
language groups – especially if these are seen as being more infected with 
HIV.33 If so, then any negative relationship between language fractionalization 
and HAART coverage may be reflecting a policy choice, rather than some 
objective difficulty involved in rolling out HAART to many different language 
groups. Hence, this variable is not included in the main regression (regression 1) 
but is added to regression 2 as part of the sensitivity analysis.  
 
Finally, an important modeling decision is whether to take into account regional 
variation in HAART coverage – i.e. hold countries in different regions to 
slightly different standards based on aggregate regional differences. One could 
argue that regional dummies should be included on the grounds that they capture 
cultural or regional differences, which may have a bearing on the HAART 
rollout independent of any policy decision. However, regional dummy variables 
are very blunt instruments in this regard and were included only in regression 3 
(as part of the sensitivity analysis) and not in the main regression.    
 
 
Results 
 
Table 1 reports the results of three (robust) regression models. The main 
regression (regression 1) controls for level of development (GDP per capita), 
external support (being a PEPFAR country or in receipt of Global Fund first 
round funding), the scale of the epidemic (HIV prevalence, the absolute size of 
the HIV-positive population and its distribution between urban and rural areas), 
other heath-related demands (non-AIDS DALY’s per capita), and politico-
institutional capacity (political stability, being an established democracy and 
percentage of births attended by skilled personnel). Four variables had 
statistically significant coefficients. The results indicate that controlling for the 
other variables in the model, being a PEPFAR focus country raises HAART 
coverage by 67%; for every one percent increase in HIV prevalence, HAART 
coverage is predicted to rise by 0.2%; for every one percentage point increase in 
the share of the HIV-positive population in urban areas, HAART coverage rises 
by 2.5 percent; and being an established democracy raises HAART coverage by 
55%. [Note that for unlogged variables, these results reflect the antilog of the 
coefficients reported in Table 1] 
 
 7
Adding language fractionalization to the model (regression 2) does not affect the 
sign or significance of the key variables much and is itself significantly 
negatively correlated with HAART coverage (for every one percentage point 
increase in language fractionalization HAART coverage declines by 1.1 
percent). Countries with diversified populations in terms of language do indeed 
have smaller HAART rollouts (but as noted above, we cannot be sure whether 
this is the result of objective results or policy choices).    
 
Adding a set of regional dummies (regression 3) renders the stable democracy 
variable insignificant, results in first round funding from the Global Fund 
becoming marginally significant (controlling for the other variables, being a 
recipient of first round funding from the Global Fund raises HAART coverage 
by 50%) and increases the overall explanatory power of the model. However, to 
what extent regional dummies are capturing objective contextual factors or are 
picking up policy stances which are similar within regions, is unclear.  
 
Table 1 reports the regression residuals for selected countries including those 
with reputations for relatively strong or weak leadership on AIDS. Figure 3 
depicts the regression residuals for all countries using the main regression 
(regression 1). Recall that a negative residual indicates the extent to which the 
predicted value exceeds actual HAART coverage (and vice versa for a positive 
residual). As can be seen from the table, some country’s residuals vary 
significantly across the different specifications. For example, Brazil’s actual 
HAART coverage exceeds its predicted coverage by a massive 43.6 percentage 
points using regression 1. When language fractionalization is included, Brazil’s 
residual falls to 31.6 (because Brazil is relatively homogenous in terms of 
language). When regional dummy variables are included as well (regression 3), 
Brazil’s residual drops down to 16.2 because Latin American countries have 
higher HAART rollouts, and hence by including regional dummies, we are 
effectively holding Brazil to a higher standard simply because it is part of the 
region. This appears to be rather arbitrary, which is why the residuals from 
regression 1 are preferred.   
 
 8
Table 1. Regressions on HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage   
Log of HAART coverage: December 2006 Log of 
MTCTP 
coverage 
(2005) 
 
1. 2. 3.  4.  
 
 
Constant 
4.437 
(2.961) 
0.138 
1.938 
(2.613) 
0.461  
0.507 
(2.080) 
0.808  
1.978 
(4.692) 
0.675 
 
(Log) GDP per capita 
(PPP) (2005) 
0.094 
(0.208) 
0.651 
0.220 
(0.181) 
0.229 
0.261 
(0.171) 
0.132 
0.073 
(0.303) 
0.810 
 
PEPFAR focus country 
0.556** 
(0.209) 
0.010 
0.581*** 
(0.193) 
0.004 
0.512** 
(0.211) 
0.018 
0.487 
(0.383) 
0.210 
 
Global Fund 1st  round 
recipient 
0.293 
(0.236) 
0.218 
0.311 
(0.234) 
0.170 
0.402* 
(0.218) 
0.070 
0.161 
(0.304) 
0.600 
 
(Log) adult HIV 
prevalence (2005) 
0.202** 
(0.084) 
0.018 
0.222*** 
(0.076 
0.005 
0.176* 
(0.095) 
0.070 
0.330** 
(0.142) 
0.025 
 
(Log) HIV+ population 
(2005) 
-0.098 
(0.070) 
0.164 
-0.075 
(0.062) 
0.234 
-0.007 
(0.052) 
0.894 
0.014 
(0.140) 
0.922 
 
Proportion of HIV + 
people in urban areas 
0.881** 
(0.342) 
0.012 
0.793** 
(0.321) 
0.016 
0.522* 
(0.316) 
0.103 
1.091** 
(0.538) 
0.049 
 
Political stability (2005) 
0.107 
(0.133) 
0.424 
0.072 
(0.128) 
0.577 
0.105 
(0.122) 
0.391 
0.086 
(0.159) 
0.593 
 
Established democracy 
0.483** 
(0.203) 
0.020 
0.438** 
(0.210) 
0.041 
0.062 
(0.221) 
0.781 
0.132** 
(0.354) 
0.711 
% of births with skilled 
health professionals 
0.004 
(0.006 
0.492 
0.001 
(0.005 
0.825 
0.002 
(0.005 
0.650 
0.026*** 
(0.006 
0.000 
(Log)  non AIDS 
DALYs per capita 
(2002) 
-0.347 
(0.315) 
0.275 
-0.011 
(0.287) 
0.968 
-0.021 
(0.242) 
0.932 
-0.598 
(0.477) 
0.216 
 
Language 
fractionalization 
 -0.948*** 
(0.294) 
0.002 
-0.643 
(0.427) 
0.137 
 
 
Latin America & the 
Caribbean 
  0.982*** 
(0.318) 
0.003 
 
 
 
Southern Africa 
  0.265 
(0.424) 
0.534 
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West Africa 
  0.561*** 
(0.207) 
0.009 
 
 
 
East Africa 
  0.215 
(0.389) 
0.583 
 
N 82 78 78 55 
Adjusted R2 0.5017 0.5697 0.6494 0.6097 
F 
Prob>F 
7.86 
0.000 
9.99 
0.000 
10.74 
0.000 
11.75 
0.000 
     
Botswana* 0 0 7.8 -50.2 
Brazil 43.6 31.6 16.2 26.2 
Burkina-Faso 27.1 27.7 24.3 3.2 
Cambodia 59.3 48.5 60.4 -0.7 
Cuba 73.9    
Gambia -1.7 1.7 -1.8 3.6 
Haiti 14.6   3.6 
Latvia -55.2 -35.6 -6.5  
Malawi 26.3 13.5 16.9 0.6 
Mexico 56.2 52.6 38.5  
Namibia 18.6 24.9 25.1 1.0 
Paraguay 42.0 48.3 35.4  
Russia -8.6 -15.6 -9.8 67.5 
Rwanda 33.3   29.9 
South Africa -36.1 -24.1 -42.6 -39.0 
Thailand 48.8 56.8 66.1  
Uganda 16.7 19.9 18.2 5.8 
Ukraine -16.1 -15.4 -13.5 75.4 
Zambia -9.0 -1.2 6.8 3.0 
Zimbabwe -8.0 -10.3 -6.2 -7.9 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Regression models 1 and 2 actually predicted negative residuals for Botswana – indicating relatively 
poor performance. However, as Botswana already has 100% HAART coverage, this is an 
unreasonable imputation, and hence the residual was rounded up to 0. This was the case in which any 
model predicted HAART coverage in excess of 100%.   
 
 
Figure 3 displays the residuals from regression 1 for all 82 countries. Brazil’s 
result is reported in a checked pattern to indicate that all three specifications 
produced a residual of greater than 15 (our cut-off point for a good performer). 
Ten other countries (Burkina-Faso, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Mali, Namibia, 
Suriname, Thailand, Paraguay and Uganda) also consistently obtained residuals 
of greater than 15. Four countries (Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador and Rwanda) have 
no predicted values for regressions 2 and 3 because of missing data on language 
fractionalization. If we consider the results for these countries from regression 1 
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to be definitive, then Cuba and Rwanda would also be classified as relatively 
good performers.  
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Figure 3: Regression Residuals for Regression 1.  
Black bars indicate scores of below -15 for all three regressions. Checked bars indicate scores of 
above 15 for all three regressions.  Grey bars represent scores >-15 and <15. White bars indicate that 
one of the regressions gave a different ranking to that of regression 1 (and those with darker borders 
indicate that missing data made it impossible to obtain predictions for these countries using 
regressions 2 and 3).  
 
 
Out of the 82 AIDS-affected countries analyzed, 46 had residuals falling 
between -15 and 15 for all three regressions, and hence should probably be 
regarded as performing as expected (or at least as not performing significantly 
worse or better than predicted). Their regression 1 residuals are represented as 
grey bars in Figure 3.  Eighteen countries in total had inconsistent classifications 
arising from different specifications. Their regression 1 residuals are depicted 
with a white bar. Three countries (South Africa, Uruguay, and Trinidad and 
Tobago), had predicted residuals of below -15 for all three regressions and thus 
we can be fairly confident in concluding that they probably could (and should) 
have achieved higher levels of HAART coverage. Figure 4 displays the ranking 
of those countries for which all three regressions predicted the same result (i.e. 
exceeding, meeting or below expectations).  
 
 11
C
am
bodia
M
exico
Thailand
Brazil
P
araguay
Burkina Faso
C
osta R
ica M
ali
Surinam
e
N
am
ibia
U
ganda
Jam
aica
E
thiopia
E
gypt
G
uyana
Burundi
Lesotho
Indonesia
C
am
eroon
Togo
C
ôte d'Ivoire
P
eru
B
arbados
M
alaysia
D
em
 R
ep of C
ongo
C
had
Senegal
Bolivia
M
auritania
Botsw
ana
N
iger
G
uinea
K
azakhstan
G
am
bia
C
ongo
N
epal
Angola
B
enin
P
hilippines
N
igeria
P
akistan
U
zbekistan
M
yanm
ar
E
ritrea
G
abon
Ecuador
Zim
babw
e
India
S
ri Lanka
Zam
bia
M
adagascar
C
entral A
frican R
ep
D
jibouti
P
apua N
ew
 G
uinea
Iran
M
ozam
bique
Tanzania
U
ruguay
Trinidad&
Tobago
South A
frica-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Ac
tu
al
 m
in
us
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 H
A
AR
T 
Co
ve
ra
ge
 
Figure 4: Country rankings 
 
 
Table 1 also reports the results of a single regression (using the same 
explanatory variables as in regression 1) on (the log of) MTCTP coverage. As 
one would expect, MTCTP coverage is significantly (and substantially) 
positively associated with maternal health services (i.e. percentage of births 
attended by a skilled health professional). Like the HAART coverage 
regressions, it also varies significantly positively with the proportion of HIV 
positive people in urban areas, with HIV prevalence and being an established 
democracy. However, unlike the HAART regressions, support from the Global 
Fund and PEPFAR was an insignificant determinant of MTCTP coverage. Note 
that as the MTCTP coverage data was available for only 55 out of the 82 
countries, these results should be treated with greater caution.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
This exploratory quantitative study provides some support for much of the 
conventional wisdom about AIDS leadership at country level. Using HAART 
coverage as the key indicator of commitment to combating AIDS, the data show 
that Brazil, Cambodia, Mexico, Namibia, Thailand, Uganda and probably also 
Cuba and Rwanda have indeed performed better than would be expected given 
their institutional characteristics, demographic challenges and level of 
development. Their reputation as poster children for good AIDS leadership is 
thus probably well deserved. Malawi performed above expectations in 
regression 1 and 3, but slipped below our +15 cut-off point for an above-
expectations categorization with regard to regression 2. Botswana’s results were 
White bars: Performing 
better than predicted 
Black bars: Performing 
worse than predicted
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more disappointing, with the country performing as expected with regard to 
HAART coverage and below expectations with regard to MTCTP coverage.  
 
South Africa’s reputation for poor AIDS leadership was strongly supported by 
the analysis. It suggests that South Africa had the resources and capacity to have 
achieved substantially higher levels of HAART coverage and MTCTP coverage. 
This is consistent with the argument that it was probably ideological reasons 
which constrained the use of antiretrovirals for MTCTP or HAART rather than 
economic or institutional constraints. Other countries with reputations for poor 
leadership on AIDS (Russia, Ukraine, Gambia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia) did not, 
however, meet our strict criteria for labeling a country as a poor performer (i.e. 
that all three regression residuals fall below -15). Ukraine’s residuals were 
below -15 except for regression 3 and in Russia’s case only in regression 2 did 
the residual fall below -15. It is, however, interesting to note the vast 
discrepancy between Russia and Ukraine’s relative performance on HAART and 
on MTCTP. The fact that both countries were able to perform relatively well 
with regard to MTCTP – but not with regard to HAART – suggests that the 
government was indeed more prepared to devote resources to the needs of 
pregnant HIV-positive women and their children than they were to assisting 
people with AIDS (most of whom were stigmatized injecting drug users).   
 
It is interesting to note that Latvia performed substantially worse than expected 
with regard to both regressions 1 and 2, but not once regional dummies were 
included. This case is probably also worth looking into in more detail, especially 
given that the few reports on HAART provision in Latvia are broadly positive.34  
Further research would also be useful into those countries which performed 
significantly better than expected, but which do not have established reputations 
for good AIDS leadership (notably Mali, Burkina-Faso, and Suriname). It is 
possible that in the general discourse about AIDS leadership, insufficient 
attention has been paid to the role that governments can play in facilitating the 
importation and distribution of generic antiretrovirals (as occurs in Burkina-
Faso) 35 and in ensuring that the health system is well organized and efficient (as 
is the case in Suriname, but not in Trinidad and Tobago).36, 37 
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